Using a unique but confidential database, this study examines the capital management practices of Australian banks under the Basel regulatory framework. We find evidence of a significantly negative relationship between the internally targeted capital buffers of banks and the state of the business cycle. This finding supports the view that the capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital buffer under the Basel III rules are necessary reforms to address the tendency of banks to manage their capital buffers in a pro-cyclical fashion.
Introduction
In its Basel III reform package, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is seeking to improve the banking sectors' ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, thus reducing the risk of spill-over from the financial sector to the real economy. A major focus of these reforms is to raise both the quality and size of the regulatory capital base, as well as to build capital buffers at individual banks that can be used in stressed economic conditions and to protect banks at times of excess credit growth. 1 The outcome of these reforms depends on the extent to which they act to modify the behaviour of banks in setting their regulatory capital targets and the approach taken by banks in managing their capital adequacy under the new standards. Using a confidential dataset, this study examines the speed of adjustment of banks' actual capital buffers towards internally targeted levels, the characteristics that may influence a bank's strategic behaviour in setting its capital targets and the determinants of the actual buffers that banks maintain above regulatorimposed minimum capital levels.
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In contrast to several previous studies (for example, Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2011), we examine the capital management practices of banks in a jurisdiction that imposes bank-specific capital requirements under Pillar 2 of the Basel framework. 3, 4 The
Australian banking regulator routinely exercises its power to set capital requirements above minimum levels established by the Basel Committee (see International Monetary Fund, 2012: 54) . This provides a natural setting to examine bank behaviour in response to customised capital requirements that incorporate the regulator's assessment of the risk profiles of individual institutions. The regulator applies Pillar 2 supervisory adjustments for risks not captured or not fully captured under Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements (for example, credit concentration risk, liquidity risk, strategic risk and reputation risk) and risks arising from external factors such as business cycle effects. 5 Studies of how banks manage their 1 By quality of capital, we refer to the focus of the Basel III reforms on increasing the proportion of regulatory capital that must be met by going-concern loss-absorbing capital, or common equity tier 1 (see Ingves, 2013) . 2 We thank the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority for allowing us access to the data for this study. 3 Many jurisdictions do not formally assess additional Pillar 2 capital, or when they do, the levels are often not disclosed by regulators or the banks (exceptions include Sweden and Denmark). 4 Three studies that examine capital management practices in response to bank-specific capital requirements are those by Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998) and Francis and Osborne (2010; 2012) in the United Kingdom. They evaluate the impact of bank-specific capital requirements set by the Bank of England and the UK Financial Services Authority on banks' capital decisions. 5 Credit risk associated with on-and off-balance sheet exposures, interest rate risk in the banking book (for internal ratings-based banks), operational risk and market risk are assessed for capital adequacy under Pillar 1 of the Basel framework.
regulatory capital positions in the context of industry-wide Pillar 1 requirements alone are likely to provide an incomplete picture of how banks respond to requirements that allow for these additional risks.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine information about banks' internally targeted capital ratios. In previous studies of banks' capital management practices (for example, Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Francis and Osborne, 2012; Shim, 2013) , the desired capital stock is unobservable and is therefore approximated by various cost and revenue variables. A concern with this approach is that the identification of characteristics that influence banks in setting their capital targets is sensitive to assumptions made by the researcher about the adjustment speed and about the dynamic properties of capital targets (see Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee and Öztekin, 2008; Iliev and Welch, 2010) . 6 We overcome this limitation by utilising information about the internally targeted capital ratios of Australian-incorporated banks. This information allows us to more accurately assess the speed of adjustment of actual capital buffers towards internally targeted levels and to identify factors that are relevant to banks' strategic behaviour in setting their capital targets. For comparison with previous studies, we estimate a partial adjustment model to explain how banks' actual capital buffers behave under the Basel framework.
Based on quarterly data for thirty banks operating in Australia from September 2003 to June 2015 (representing about three-quarters of the number of banks and ninety-nine per cent of the total assets of locally-incorporated banks), we find evidence of a significantly negative relationship between the internally targeted capital buffers of banks and the state of the business cycle. This finding supports the view that the capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital buffer under Basel III are sensible reforms to address the tendency of banks to manage their capital buffers in a pro-cyclical fashion. However, we also find evidence of forward-looking behaviour by bank managers that is likely to reduce the impact of fluctuations in credit market conditions on their lending activities: Banks set higher capital targets when the demand for loanable funds is increasing (reflected in increases in dwelling approvals and business confidence). Higher capital buffers maintained by internal ratingsbased (IRB) banks mitigate against the model risk associated with determining the capital requirement using their internal models. In relation to costs, the results suggest that banks economise on capital when the competitive landscape limits the extent to which they can pass on the costs of servicing surplus capital to their customers.
Capital management in banks
Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks maintain more capital than required by prudential regulators (see among other studies Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995; Alfon, Argimon and Bascuñana-Ambrós, 2004; Estrella, 2004; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Berger and Bouwman, 2013) . 7 Banks generally assess their risks differently from regulators;
for instance, using their own economic capital models or stress testing programs.
Consequently, banks assess their capital needs according to their own assumptions and risk appetites. Banks may accumulate excess capital to signal soundness to the market and to satisfy the expectations of ratings agencies (Nier and Baumann, 2006; Flannery and Rangan, 2008) . Banks may also maintain a buffer of capital to protect against violating the regulatory minimum requirements (Marcus, 1984; Rime, 2001; Lindquist, 2004; Peura and Keppo, 2006) . By maintaining capital as a buffer, the bank insures itself against costs arising from a supervisory intervention in response to a violation of the requirements.
Following the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, a major focus of regulatory reform has been to address the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital requirements. 8 During cyclical downturns, losses erode banks' capital, while risk-based capital requirements such as those under the Basel II framework become more onerous (Estrella, 2004; Repullo and Suarez, 2013) . The risk of a credit crunch transpiring in these circumstances is increased if banks respond to greater perceived risk by building up their capital buffers. Consistent with this prediction, Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina (2004) , Stolz and Wedow (2011) and Shim (2013) find that the actual capital buffers of banks exhibit negative co-movement with the business cycle. However, it is unclear whether risks actually increase during downturns. To the contrary, 7 Brown and Davis (2009) develop a model of capital management and risk management in mutual financial institutions and test their model using data for Australian credit unions. 8 In their Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System of 2 April 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20) committed to "mitigate procyclicality, including a requirement for banks to build buffers of resources in good times that they can draw down when conditions deteriorate". 9 In Europe, Jokipii and Milne (2008) find that capital buffers of large banks, and of commercial and savings banks, co-move negatively with the business cycle. However, the capital buffers of small banks and cooperative banks co-move positively with the cycle. Their results for small banks are likely to be caused by capital market frictions. Small banks find it relatively costly to raise new equity capital while co-operative banks are unable to make such issues at all. These banks are thus reliant on retained earnings as a protection against insolvency and this can explain their preference for building up capital during economic upturns. Rajan (1994) and Crockett (2002) argue that portfolio risks increase during upturns.
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Favourable conditions associated with an economic expansion could lead to excessive increases in lending and a relaxation of lending standards. In this case, banks may build up their capital buffers during cyclical upturns to protect against future potential losses. This study tests the extent to which the internally targeted capital buffers of banks are influenced by the current state of the business cycle.
Aside from the current state of the business cycle, banks may act in response to expected future growth opportunities in managing their capital positions (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995) . Banks that have a comfortable buffer over regulator-imposed minimum capital levels are favourably poised to raise wholesale funds quickly and at competitive interest rates and to ensure uninterrupted relationships with their borrowers in the event that profitable investment opportunities emerge (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) . Conversely, banks that are thinly capitalised in relative terms may lose market share to those that are well capitalised in the event of a substantial increase in loan demand. This study tests whether banks set higher capital targets above minimum regulatory requirements when the outlook for economic activity is improving and the demand for loanable funds is increasing.
Using capital has a direct cost for banks, because the holders of the capital instruments need to be remunerated. In the context of debt tax shields and implicit subsidies, capital may be more costly for banks than other sources of funding such as retail deposits or wholesale debt (Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano, 2013) . Banks may also be discouraged from keeping larger capital buffers by the nature of competition in financial services (Fonseca and González, 2010) . Arguably, the most important competitive edge that banks have is the ability to fund themselves cheaply. If a bank maintains a more conservative capital buffer that raises its cost of funding relative to other intermediaries, it may lose a substantial portion of its business. In support of this hypothesis, Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) find that banks gravitate towards lower and more uniform capital ratios in response to regulatory changes that increase the degree of competition. In this study, we test whether banks set lower capital targets when the costs of servicing surplus capital are higher and when the level of competitive intensity in the banking industry makes it more difficult for individual banks to pass on those costs to their customers.
Capital adequacy regulation in Australia
In Australia, banks are regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), which was established in 1998. APRA has the power under federal legislation to set prudential standards, which underpin its approach to supervising depository institutions. The prudential standards set out minimum capital, governance and risk management requirements, which are legally binding. APRA is empowered to impose a range of sanctions should a bank breach minimum capital requirements and intervenes at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below minimum levels. If a bank's capital ratio declines below the required capital ratio set by the regulator and towards the Basel minimum, APRA would significantly increase its supervisory intensity and require the bank to develop and implement a plan to restore its capital ratio. In situations where the bank is unable or unwilling to respond, APRA may resort to the exercise of formal powers under the Banking Act 1959. These include the power to restrict bank operations and to suspend payments to shareholders. In more serious cases, it has the power to order a compulsory transfer of the business of a bank or to revoke a banking licence. Consequently, a bank with capital that APRA considers to be inadequate is likely to incur greater regulatory costs than a bank with adequate capital.
Implementation of the Basel Accord capital requirements
14 APRA generally exercises its power to set minimum requirements for tier 1 and total capital above minimum levels established by the Basel Committee (see International Monetary Fund, 2012: 54 
Setting of target levels of capital

Data and sample
This study focuses on 30 banks operating in Australia with at least twelve quarters of relevant data in the period from September 2003 to June 2015. These banks represent about threequarters of the number of banks and ninety-nine per cent of the total assets of Australianincorporated banks. For non-retail portfolios, there are two broad approaches within the IRB framework: foundation IRB banks are permitted to provide their own estimates of probability of default (PD) and maturity (M) and must use supervisory estimates for loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD), whereas advanced IRB banks are permitted to provide their own estimates of all the credit risk components. Macquarie Bank is a foundation bank and the four major banks are advanced banks. 17 The internal capital targets examined in this study represent the floor to a target band for capital set by the bank. The bank will also typically set a ceiling -and together the floor and ceiling reflect the target operating band for capital for the business. As capital levels fluctuate from day-to-day, this band allows the business to operate effectively while also ensuring enough capital is maintained to meet the bank's risks and strategic ambitions (the floor) while ensuring the bank performs efficiently by not becoming needlessly overweight on costly capital (the ceiling). 18 Thirty-one observations for banks with extraordinarily large buffers over APRA-imposed minimum capital levels are excluded from the sample. 19 Foreign bank branches are not permitted to accept retail deposits from Australian residents. The mean tier 1 and total capital ratios for all sample banks are 11.4 per cent and 13.9 per cent respectively, suggesting that on average banks have a comfortable buffer over the Basel minimum requirements. 20 After remaining steady for a period of four and a half years, both the tier 1 and total capital ratios increase substantially in response to the financial crisis of
Results
Descriptive statistics
2008-2009 and in preparation for more stringent requirements under Basel III (see figure 1) .
In this study, we use two backward-looking measures of the risk associated with a bank's assets: (i) the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; 21 and (ii) the average real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters. Further, we use two forward-looking indicators of credit market conditions: (i) the change in private dwelling approvals relative to the previous quarter; and (ii) the level of the National Australia Bank business confidence index. 22 For sample banks, the median ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is 0.97 per cent. The median annualised GDP growth rate is 2.89 per cent. Table 3 presents the correlations between the variables in our sample. Banks with greater exposure to business lending have larger buffers over APRA-imposed minimum capital levels. Banks have larger capital buffers when business confidence is higher and when competitive forces in the banking industry are less intense. Larger banks and those with larger trading books and higher returns on equity have smaller buffers (over bank-specific requirements for both the tier 1 and total capital ratios).
20 Furthermore, Australian banks generally maintain a comfortable buffer over APRA-imposed minimum capital levels in the period examined in this study. 21 A loan is non-performing when payments of interest and principal are 90 days or more past due or payments are less than 90 days past due, but there are other good reasons to doubt that payments will be made in full. 22 The National Australia Bank business confidence index is based on a survey of more than 400 firms across the non-farm business sector. It is a measure of respondents' expectations of business conditions in their industry for the upcoming period. Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables of the sample bank-observations T1BUF is the difference between the actual tier 1 risk-based capital ratio and the required tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator. TOTBUF is the difference between the actual total risk-based capital ratio and the required total risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator. LBUS is loans to businesses divided by total loans. NPL is non-performing loans divided by total loans. GDPG is the average real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters. PSDA is the change in private dwelling approvals relative to the previous quarter. CONF is the level of the National Australia Bank business confidence index. TRADB is the ratio of trading assets to total assets. ROE is the average return on equity over the past four quarters. CR4 is the market share of deposits held by the four largest banks. LOGSIZE is the logarithm of total assets in billions of Australian dollars. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
T1BUF
Estimation results
The speed of adjustment of banks' actual capital buffers towards internally targeted levels
In this subsection, a panel regression approach is used to examine the speed of adjustment of banks' actual regulatory capital buffers towards internally targeted levels. Specifically, the change in a bank's actual capital buffer over the past quarter is regressed on the difference between the target capital buffer set by the bank and the actual capital buffer at the beginning of the quarter.
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The specification of the panel regression is as follows:
where , and , * are the actual and target buffers over APRA-imposed minimum capital levels, respectively, of bank i at time t. 25 The proportionate adjustment towards the target capital buffer in each quarter is δ. Bank-specific intercepts capture the influence of any capital ceiling set by a bank and any drift in a bank's capital buffer over time that is unrelated to the adjustment towards its targeted level. All t-statistics are adjusted for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the regression residuals by clustering the standard errors at both the bank and quarter levels (as suggested by Thompson, 2011) . Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficient on the variable measuring the difference between the target capital buffer and the actual capital buffer at the beginning of the quarter is positive and significant in both regressions. 26 This finding supports the proposition that banks actively manage both their tier 1 and total capital buffers; adjusting 23 Data on target capital ratios set by banks are available from December 2004 and the number of banks reporting their capital targets increases over the sample period. 24 Two observations for a bank with extraordinary changes in its actual tier 1 capital buffer, both as a consequence of a merger transaction, are excluded from the analysis in this subsection. 25 To eliminate the impact of changes in APRA-imposed minimum capital levels on estimated adjustment speeds, BUFi,t-1 is calculated as the actual risk-based capital ratio at time t-1 minus the required risk-based capital ratio at time t. 26 Then again, the coefficient on the same variable is significantly different from one in both regressions (based on unreported tests). This finding is in line with the view that the costs of capital adjustment are an important reason for the maintaining of substantial capital buffers (Alfon, Argimon and Bascuñana-Ambrós, 2004) . For example, banks may be reluctant to react to negative capital disturbances instantaneously, recognising that capital raisings may be interpreted as a negative signal with regard to the bank's value (Myers and Majluf, 1984) .
these buffers back towards targeted levels whenever they move away from internally targeted levels (for example, due to higher than expected earnings or portfolio losses). The estimated coefficients in the two regressions are similar in magnitude, indicating that the costs of adjustment pertaining to the tier 1 and total capital ratios are similar. The coefficients correspond to a speed of adjustment towards desired capital buffers of around 56 per cent per annum. Table 4 The adjustment of bank actual capital buffers towards targeted levels
This table examines the speed of adjustment of bank actual regulatory capital buffers towards internally targeted levels. Actual tier 1 capital buffer is the difference between the actual tier 1 risk-based capital ratio and the required tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator. Actual total capital buffer is the difference between the actual total risk-based capital ratio and the required total risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator. Target tier 1 capital buffer is the difference between the target tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set by the bank and the required tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set by the regulator. Target total capital buffer is the difference between the target total risk-based capital ratio set by the bank and the required total risk-based capital ratio set by the regulator. Regressions are estimated using quarterly data from December 2004 to June 2015. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the bank and quarter levels. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Change in actual tier 1 capital bufferi,t Change in actual total capital bufferi,t Independent variables (1) (2)
Target tier 1 capital bufferi,t -Actual tier 1 capital bufferi,t-1 0.1843 *** (3.77) Target total capital bufferi,t -Actual total capital bufferi,t-1 0.1797 ** 
The determinants of banks' target regulatory capital buffers
In this subsection, a panel regression approach is used to examine the determinants of banks' target regulatory capital buffers (that is, the difference between the target risk-based capital ratio set by the bank and the required risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator). Specifically, banks' target regulatory capital buffers are regressed on various bank characteristics including measures of asset quality and expected economic opportunities. 
where , * is the difference between the target risk-based capital ratio set by the bank and the required risk-based capital ratio set by the regulator, NPLi,t is non-performing loans divided by total loans, GDPGt is the average real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters, LEADt is a leading indicator of economic activity (the change in private dwelling approvals relative to the previous quarter or the level of the National Australia Bank business confidence index), IRBi,t is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank has received approval to use the internal ratings-based approach to credit risk, ROEi,t is the average return on equity over the past four quarters, CR4t is the market share of deposits held by the four largest banks and LOGSIZEi,t is the logarithm of total assets in billions of Australian dollars.
The regression results are presented in table 5. The backward-looking measures of a bank's asset risk, NPL and GDP growth, are included as explanatory variables in the regressions.
The coefficient on NPL is expected to be positive if banks with more risky portfolios seek to build stronger capital buffers in excess of regulatory requirements. There is no evidence for this conjecture in the results. To the contrary, the coefficient on NPL is negative in all four regressions and is statistically significant in the regressions for total capital (columns 3 and 4). This result suggests that banks with more conservative profiles tend to set higher capital targets over bank-specific regulatory requirements and may have a smaller appetite for risk in general.
The GDP growth variable captures the effect of recent macroeconomic conditions on target regulatory capital buffers, beyond the risk profile of an individual bank. The coefficient on GDP growth is expected to be negative if banks set higher capital targets in a deteriorating macroeconomic environment. Consistent with this proposition, the coefficient on GDP growth is negative and statistically significant in all four regressions. The effect of macroeconomic conditions on bank capital targets is economically significant. A decrease of one per cent in the real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters is associated with an increase in the target tier 1 capital buffer of 50 basis points and an increase in the target total capital buffer of 55 basis points (based on the estimated coefficients in columns 1 and 3 of table 5). This finding is consistent with previous literature that documents a negative relationship between the state of the business cycle and actual capital buffers for banks (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004 in Spain; Stolz and Wedow, 2011 in Germany; Shim, 2013 in the United States).
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Turning to the forward-looking indicators of credit market conditions, the coefficients on the dwelling approvals and business confidence variables can be expected to be positive if banks set higher capital targets when the outlook for lending activity is improving. The estimated coefficient on the change in dwelling approvals is positive and significant in the regressions for both tier 1 capital and total capital (columns 1 and 3 of table 5). The coefficient on business confidence is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level in the regression for total capital (column 4). These results are consistent with forward-looking behaviour by bank managers, who set higher capital targets when economic activity is gathering momentum and the demand for loanable funds is increasing. Table 5 The effects of asset quality and expected economic opportunities on bank target capital buffers:
Random-effects GLS regressions
This table examines the effects of asset quality and expected economic opportunities on bank target regulatory capital buffers. Target tier 1 capital buffer is the difference between the target tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set by the bank and the required tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set by the regulator. Target total capital buffer is the difference between the target total risk-based capital ratio set by the bank and the required total risk-based capital ratio set by the regulator. NPL is non-performing loans divided by total loans. GDP growth is the average real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters. Dwelling approvals is the change in private dwelling approvals relative to the previous quarter. Business confidence is the level of the National Australia Bank business confidence index. IRB approach is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank has received approval to use the IRB approach to credit risk. Return on equity is the average return on equity over the past four quarters. Concentration ratio is the market share of deposits held by the four largest banks. Log size is the logarithm of total assets in billions of Australian dollars. Regressions are estimated using quarterly data from December 2004 to June 2015. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The other variables are not statistically significant. The coefficient in front of log size is negative in the regressions for tier 1 capital, suggesting that larger banks set marginally lower targets over bank-specific regulatory requirements. IRB accreditation status, return on equity and the industry concentration ratio do not have a significant effect on bank target capital buffers.
The determinants of banks' actual regulatory capital buffers
In this subsection, we use various cost and revenue variables to approximate the desired capital stock and we test the significance of those variables within a partial adjustment framework for banks' actual capital buffers. 29 This analysis allows us to compare our results with those from studies that do not have access to data on banks' internally targeted capital buffers (for example, Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2011) . Furthermore, it allows us to better distinguish characteristics that are relevant to a bank's strategic behaviour in setting its target capital buffer from other characteristics that impact on the size of the bank's capital base over time.
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The specification of the partial adjustment model is as follows:
where BUFi,t is the difference between the actual risk-based capital ratio and the required risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator, 31 NPLi,t is non-performing loans divided by total loans, GDPGt is the average real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters, LEADt is a leading indicator of economic activity (the change in private dwelling approvals relative to the previous quarter or the level of the National Australia Bank business confidence index), TRADBi,t is the ratio of trading assets to total assets, IRBi,t is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank has received approval to use the internal 29 For a theoretical derivation and explanation of linear-quadratic partial adjustment models of bank capital, see Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina (2004) and Estrella (2004) . 30 Six observations for banks with extraordinary changes in their actual tier 1 capital buffers and two observations for banks with extraordinary changes in their actual total capital buffers, all as a consequence of merger transactions, are excluded from the analysis in this subsection. 31 To ensure that the adjustment parameter, δ, measures the proportionate adjustment towards the desired capital buffer at the end of the quarter, BUFi,t-1 is calculated as the actual risk-based capital ratio at time t-1 minus the required risk-based capital ratio at time t.
ratings-based approach to credit risk, ROEi,t is the average return on equity over the past four quarters, CR4t is the market share of deposits held by the four largest banks, LOGSIZEi,t is the logarithm of total assets in billions of Australian dollars, LISTEDi,t is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank is listed on a stock exchange and FORSi,t is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank is a foreign bank authorised to carry on banking business in Australia through a locally incorporated subsidiary.
Since the model includes the lagged dependent variable among the regressors and since some of our other explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous, we employ the two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . 32 The instruments chosen include two to five lags of the dependent variable (BUF) together with two lags of ROE. In each case, the number of lags is chosen to avoid correlation with the error term ui,t and, at the same time, problems associated with instrument proliferation. A concern when using the GMM estimator is that a large number of instruments can lead to biased estimates of the coefficients on endogenous variables and invalidate the Hansen test statistic (see Roodman, 2009 ). Consequently, we collapse the instrument matrix for the endogenous variables so that there are no longer unique instruments for each time period. Explanatory variables other than BUF and ROE are considered to be exogenous and are therefore used as their own instruments.
The results for the partial adjustment model are presented in table 6. The costs of adjusting capital, captured by the lagged dependent variable, are positive and significant in all four regressions. The coefficients in the regressions for the actual tier 1 capital buffer correspond to speeds of adjustment towards desired capital of around 50 per cent per annum. This estimate is similar to those reported from the analysis of the adjustment of banks' actual tier 1 and total capital buffers towards internally targeted levels (table 4) . However, the coefficients in the regressions for the actual total capital buffer correspond to adjustment speeds that are much faster (83 per cent per annum). This pattern suggests that banks may take additional factors into consideration when managing their actual total capital buffers that they do not consider when setting their target total capital buffers. The influence of such other factors (for example, the intensity of rivalry among competitors) may explain the faster adjustment towards the modelled target capital buffer vis-à-vis that towards the reported target capital buffer. The results are also consistent with the proposition that, in the period examined for this study, banks are more constrained by regulatory requirements for their total capital ratios than for their tier 1 capital ratios.
The results with respect to the impact of the backward-looking risk measures on actual capital buffers are generally consistent with those with respect to the impact of the same variables on target capital buffers (table 5) . The coefficient on NPL is negative in all four regressions and is statistically significant in the regressions for total capital (table 6, columns 3 and 4). This result further supports the view that some banks have more conservative profiles; in relation to both their asset quality and the size of the buffers they maintain against potential future losses (consistent with Alfon, Argimon and Bascuñana-Ambrós, 2004; and Lindquist, 2004) .
The coefficient on GDP growth is negative in all four regressions and is statistically significant in the regressions for total capital. This result suggests that banks allow their capital stocks to decrease during periods when the domestic economy is expanding at a faster-than-average rate (consistent with Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004; Francis and Osborne, 2010; Stolz and Wedow, 2011; Shim, 2013) .
The results with respect to the impact of the forward-looking indicators of credit market conditions on actual capital buffers provide less consistent evidence than those with respect to the impact of these variables on target capital buffers (table 5) . The coefficient on business confidence is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level in the regression for total capital (table 6, column 4). This result supports the idea that banks seek to increase their capital stocks in anticipation of future expected economic opportunities. However, the coefficient on dwelling approvals is statistically insignificant in the regressions for both tier 1 and total capital (columns 1 and 3). Thus, increased lending activity flowing from increases in residential building approvals may prevent banks from achieving their objective of increasing their actual capital buffers in these circumstances. Table 6 The effects of asset quality and expected economic opportunities on bank actual capital buffers: Dynamic panel estimation, two-step system GMM This table examines the effects of asset quality and expected economic opportunities on bank actual regulatory capital buffers. The sample period is September 2003 to June 2015. Actual tier 1 capital buffer is the difference between the actual tier 1 risk-based capital ratio and the required tier 1 risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator. Actual total capital buffer is the difference between the actual total riskbased capital ratio and the required total risk-based capital ratio set for the bank by the regulator. NPL is nonperforming loans divided by total loans. GDP growth is the average real GDP growth rate over the past four quarters. Dwelling approvals is the change in private dwelling approvals relative to the previous quarter.
Business confidence is the level of the National Australia Bank business confidence index. Trading assets is the ratio of trading assets to total assets. IRB approach is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank has received approval to use the IRB approach to credit risk. Return on equity is the average return on equity over the past four quarters. Concentration ratio is the market share of deposits held by the four largest banks. Log size is the logarithm of total assets in billions of Australian dollars. Listed is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Foreign subsidiary is a zero-one dummy variable which equals one if the bank is a foreign bank authorised to carry on banking business in Australia through a locally incorporated subsidiary. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for extra variation due to estimated parameters in the weight matrix using the Windmeijer correction. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. AR(1) and AR(2) represent first and second order residual autocorrelation tests. The coefficient on the IRB dummy variable is positive and significant in all four regressions.
This finding supports the proposition that internal ratings-based banks maintain higher capital buffers to mitigate against the model risk associated with estimating the risk weightings on assets using their internal models. However, it also reflects a widening divergence in mortgage risk weights between the standardised and IRB approaches to credit risk since the introduction of the IRB approach (see Treasury, 2014: 60-6) . As calibrated during the sample period, the IRB approach generates, on average, a lower capital requirement for residential mortgage exposures than the standardised approach. 33 To some extent, the lower average capital requirement can be explained by the deliberate structure of incentives within the Basel II framework; intended to encourage banks seeking IRB accreditation to enhance their risk management capabilities.
For the cost-related variables, the results suggest that the level of competitive intensity in the banking industry is more influential in determining the size of capital buffers than the cost of servicing capital per se. The estimated coefficient on the cost of equity is statistically insignificant in all four regressions. Thus, there is no evidence that banks reduce their capital buffers when the cost of servicing surplus capital is higher. 34 However, the coefficient on the industry concentration ratio is positive and significant in all of our regressions. This result suggests that banks economise on capital when competitive intensity is higher (indicated by a greater dispersion of deposits beyond the four major banks). In these circumstances, banks are likely to be more restricted in the extent to which they can pass on the costs of servicing surplus capital to their customers (for example, by paying lower interest rates on deposits or charging higher interest rates on loans). 35 This finding is consistent with research by Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) , who observe that banks gravitate towards lower and more uniform capital ratios when faced with more intense competition. 33 As of early 2014, the average risk weight for housing lending under the IRB approach was 18 per cent, as compared to 39 per cent under the standardised approach (APRA, 2014: 74) . 34 Following previous studies (for example, Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004; Francis and Osborne, 2010) , we include the return on equity in our regressions to control for the direct costs of remunerating excess capital. However, we acknowledge that this variable reflects both revenue and cost. According to the revenue interpretation, a bank with strong earnings may be willing to operate with a reduced capital buffer because earnings substitute for capital as a buffer against unexpected shocks. In any event, the expected sign of the coefficient on this variable is negative under both the cost and revenue interpretations. 35 In theory, increasing a bank's capital buffer by issuing equity capital and retiring debt should not affect the overall cost of funding the bank (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller, 1995) . However, certain government policies make equity financing more expensive for banks than debt financing (see Cummings and Wright, 2016) . For example, banks benefit from a tax advantage associated with debt financing. In addition, the interest rates a bank pays on its guaranteed debt may not fall as capital levels and the perceived safety of the bank on a standalone basis increase.
There is no significant relationship between the ratio of trading assets to total assets and the size of actual capital buffers. 36 Thus, there is no evidence that banks build larger buffers to protect against the impact of more frequent revaluations for these assets on the stability of the bank's regulatory capital base. The coefficient on the size variable is negative in all four regressions and is statistically significant in the regressions for total capital, consistent with the notion that larger banks have more diversified portfolios. 37 The coefficients in front of the dummy variables indicating that a bank is listed on a stock exchange or that it is a foreign subsidiary bank are statistically insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that listed banks are content to maintain smaller capital buffers seeing that they have greater access to capital markets; or that foreign subsidiary banks maintain smaller capital buffers seeing that they may be able to source additional capital from a foreign parent.
Conclusion
Based on confidential regulatory data collected by APRA, this study examines the capital management practices of 30 banks operating in Australia in the period from September 2003
to June 2015. In previous studies of banks' capital management practices (for example, Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008) , the desired capital stock is unobservable and is therefore approximated by various cost and revenue variables. We overcome this limitation by utilising information about the internally targeted capital ratios of Australian-incorporated banks. This information allows us to more accurately assess the speed of adjustment of actual capital ratios towards internally targeted levels and to identify factors that are relevant to banks' behaviour in setting their capital targets. For comparison with previous studies, we estimate a partial adjustment model to explain how banks' actual capital buffers have behaved in the sample period.
Our results, obtained before the introduction of the conservation buffer and countercyclical buffer under the Basel III capital framework, support the view that these reforms are necessary to address the propensity of banks to manage their regulatory capital buffers in a pro-cyclical fashion. In particular, we find evidence of a significantly negative relationship between the internally targeted capital buffers of banks and the rate of GDP growth. This finding is consistent with previous literature that documents a negative relationship between banks' actual capital buffers and the state of the business cycle (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004; Stolz and Wedow, 2011; Shim, 2013) . By focussing on banks' internal targets, our research demonstrates that the potential pro-cyclical impact of the Basel II capital framework originates through two channels: (i) In a deteriorating macroeconomic environment, regulatory requirements are more burdensome (as bank exposures are downgraded); and (ii) banks set higher target capital buffers above regulatory requirements.
Despite the negative relationship of target capital buffers with the state of the business cycle, we find evidence of forward-looking behaviour by bank managers that is likely to dampen the impact of fluctuations in credit market conditions on their lending activities. Banks set higher target capital buffers over regulatory requirements when economic activity is gathering momentum and the demand for loanable funds is increasing (reflected in increases in dwelling approvals and business confidence). This finding implies that banks adjust their capital targets in light of future expected economic opportunities. However, this type of behaviour is less consistently evident in relation to banks' actual capital buffers than it is in relation to their target capital buffers. Credit portfolio growth associated with improving economic conditions may prevent banks from achieving their strategic objective of increasing their regulatory capital adequacy in these circumstances; or alternatively, capital raisings initiated to fund future expected economic opportunities may fall behind in an upturn.
This study reveals other tactical or transitory factors that impact on banks' actual capital buffers, but that are not reflected in their capital targets. Higher capital buffers maintained by IRB-accredited banks mitigate against the model risk associated with determining the capital requirement using their internal models (although this finding may simply reflect the widening divergence in mortgage risk weights between the standardised and IRB approaches to credit risk in the sample period). The results suggest that the level of competitive intensity in the banking industry is more influential in determining the size of capital buffers than the cost of servicing surplus capital. Consistent with the findings of Fonseca and González (2010) and Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) , banks are observed to economise on capital when competitive intensity is greater. In these circumstances, depository institutions are likely to be more restrained in the extent to which they can pass on the costs of servicing surplus capital to their customers.
